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ABSTRACT
Although the national media has given increased attention to the venture capital process, misconcep­
tions continue to proliferate. One often hears about the incredible capital gains of IPO share prices. This 
paper refutes the myth that investors demand very high rates of return to compensate for the risks involved 
in financing ventures.
The paper investigates actual performance of 3,063 Initial Public Offerings of companies that were 
backed by venture capital from 1968 until 1998 stratified by current actively and inactively traded compa­
nies and by stages of financing. The main findings are that annualized returns .are different for current active­
ly and inactively traded firms and for many of the stages of financing but that they are much lower than the 
ones reported by the media and the venture capital literature.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the actual performance of 3,063 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of companies 
that were backed by venture capital from 1968 until the end of 1998. The unique database includes current
actively and inactively trading public companies. ^
In the past, venture capital financing was regarded as the early-stage financing for relatively small, 
rapidly growing companies. At the end of the 1990s, venture investment activity covers many phases of busi­
ness growth. Besides early-stage financing, venture capitalists provide expansion financing for companies 
that have overcome initial difficulties and require additional capital for growth. After all, these companies 
do not yet have access to public or credit-oriented institutional funding. However, venture capitalists, togeth­
er with entrepreneurs and business management, are involved in all stages of financing. For example, they 
finance leveraged buyouts, which may involve purchasing ailing corporate divisions or absentee-owned pri­
vate business with the objective of revitalizing them.
Venture capital traditionally has been a low profile, private industry. Although the national media has 
given increased attention to the venture capital process during the 1980s and 1990s, misconceptions about 
the industry continue to proliferate. One often hears about the incredible capital gains of IPO share prices. 
One case cites and recites the success of eBay Inc., an online auction house that went public in September 
1998 at $18 a share and was trading at $241.25 in December 1998, a 1,240 percent increase from its offer­
ing price. Anpther success story frequently mentioned is Inktomi Corp., the developer of online search tech­
nology. The company, which was originally offered at $18 a share in July 1998, had a price of $129.38 per 
share at the close of that year, a 618.8 percent increase. Another example is Theglobe.com, an online com­
munity site, which had a 605 percent gain on its first day of trading.
Since many publications are vague about their definitions of various venture capital terms, the fol­
lowing terms have been clearly defined.
Early-Stage Financing
Seed Financing is a relatively small amount of capital provided to an investor or entrepreneur to prove a con­
cept and to qualify for start-up capital. If the initial steps are successful, this may involve product develop­
ment and market research as well as building a management team and developing a business plan.
Research and Development Financing (R«&D) is a tax-advantaged partnership set up to finance product 
development for start-ups and more mature companies. Investors secure both tax write-offs for the invest­
ments and a later share of the profits if the product development is successftil.
Start-up Financing is provided to companies completing product development and initial marketing. These 
companies may be in the process of organizing or they may already be in business for one year or less, but 
they have yet to sell their products commercially. Usually such firms will have made market studies, assem­
bled the key management, developed a business plan, and readied themselves to do business.
First-Stage Financing is provided to companies that have expended their initial capital (oflten in developing 
and market testing a prototype) and require funds to initiate full-scale manufacturing and sales.
Expansion Financing
Second-Stage Financing is working capital for the initial expansion of a company that is producing and 
shipping and has growing accounts receivable and inventories. Although the company has made progress, it 
may not yet be showing a profit.
Third-Stage or Mezzanine Financing is provided for major expansion of a company with an increasing sales 
volume that is breaking even or showing a profit. These funds are used for further plant expansion, market­
ing, working capital, or development of an improved product.
Bridge Financing is needed at times when a company plans to go public within sLx months to a year. Bridge 
financing, which is often strucmred so that it can be repaid from the proceeds of a public underwriting, can 
also involve restructuring of major stockholder positions through secondary transactions. Restructuring is
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undertaken if there are early investors who want to reduce or liquidate their positions, or if management has 
changed and the stockholdings of the former management, their relatives and associates are being bought out 
to relieve a potential oversupply of stock when going public.
Acquisition/Buyout Financing
Acquisition Financing provides funds to finance an acquisition of another company.
Management/Leveraged Buyout (LBO) funds enable an operating management group to acquire a product 
line or business (which may be at any stage of development) from either a public or private company; often 
these purchased companies are closely held or family owned. Management/leveraged buyouts usually 
involve revitalizing an operation in such a way that entrepreneurial management gains a significant equity 
interest.
The data enable one to ascertain the relationship among company rate of return, share price at the IPO 
date, IPO size, current total shares, and the role of venture capital. The role of venture capital in leveraged 
buyouts is also investigated along with the company’s investment-stage levels: seed, research and develop­
ment, start-up, first-stage, second-stage, third-stage, bridge, acquisition, and management leveraged buyout 
funds. Examination of these data rebuffs many of the myths and misconceptions about the venture-capital 
industry and its performances.
The remainder of the paper is organized around additional sections. Section II presents a brief review 
of the literature; Section III.l presents the empirical findings for all firms and for current actively and inac­
tively traded firms; Section III.2 presents the findings by stages of financing for all firms and current active­
ly and inactively traded firms; Section IV offers an econometric analysis of the data; and Section V con­
cludes.
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In this paper, we seek to refute the myth that investors demand very high rates of return to compen­
sate for the risks involved in financing ventures. For example, Roberts and Stevenson (1992) write about tar­
get returns of 50 percent or 60 percent and claim that such returns are not uncommon. Rich and Gumpert 
(1992) offer the following assessment;
“Because risk and reward are closely related, investors believe companies with fvilly developed prod­
ucts and proven management teams should yield between 35 percent and 40 percent on their invest­
ment, while those with incomplete products and management teams are expected to bring in 60 per­
cent annual compounded returns.”
A 1984 congressional survey find that independent private venture capital firms expect a minimum 
annualized rate of return on individual investments that range from 75 percent for seed-stage financing to 
about 35 percent per year for bridge financing (as noted by Bygrave and Timmons (1992)).
Furthermore, Timmons (1994, 1999) provides a more comprehensive summary of rates of return 
sought by venture capital investors according to stage of investment (see, Table 1). The basis for such high 
rates of remm is the result of asking venture capital investors to report the rates they apply when discount­
ing the projected cash flows of proposed new ventures.
Poindexter (1976), however, studies 92 venture capital firms and finds that the average return dunng
the 1960s and early 1970s is about 14 percent. Hoban (1976) examines returns (before management fees) 
for a sample of over 100 investments by venture capital firms made during the years 1960 to 1968, and he 
finds that, before deducting management fees, the average return through 1975 was 23 percent. Once one 
accounts for management fees, the return is estimated at 18-19 percent.
In another study, Ibbotson and Brinson (1987) find an average return of 16 percent for the stock price 
performance of public venture capital firms over the period 1959-1985. Martin and Petty (1983) find a much 
higher average rate of return, 27 percent, but they study only 11 venture capital firms over a short period of
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five years, from 1974 through 1979.
Bygrave and Timmons (1992) examine returns that are based on valuations by the ftind managers. 
The study is limited to funds in existence for at least five years and has a time period of 16 years, from 1974 
through 1989. They find that the maximum return on a caphalized-weighted basis was 32 percent; the min­
imum was a negative return of 3 percent. The compound annual return over the period was approximately
13.5 percent.
Venture Economics (1997, page 272) estimates that the internal rate of return (IRR) performance of 
venture capital funds between 1986-1996 has roughly paralleled the performance of the stock market. While 
the 10-year holding period Internal Rate of Return (IRR), which ended in 1996, was 20.7 percent, most of it 
was generated in the last five years, over which the median was 23.7 percent.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
in.l Empirical Results for All, Current Actively and Inactively Traded Firms
The data consist of all venmre-backed public companies (3,063) from the end of 1968 to August
1998.^ Upon analysis, some interesting statistics are revealed. Table 2 presents basic statistics for annual­
ized returns from the IPO date until the 08/19/1998. The descriptive statistics include the mean, median, 
standard deviation, Pearson coefficient of skewness, and the minimum and maximum data values. In addi­
tion, Table 2 includes the t-statistics testing the null hypothesis whether the mean of the variable equals to 
zero and the observed significance level, p value, of the t-statistic test. A low level of the p value implies that 
the mean of the variable is significantly different than zero.
The annualized remrn that is gained from the date of the IPO to the terminal sampled data was -45.34 
percent, with standard deviation of 99.58 percent. The p-value of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis 
that the mean of annualized return is equal to zero is 0.0001. Thus, the null hypothesis, which states that 
mean of annualized returns is equal to zero, is rejected by the test. Although the maximum annualized returns 
of the IPOs was impressive (3,296.1 percent), the second quartile for this variable was -100 percent. 
Moreover, the bottom three quartiles have annualized returns of 0.2 percent or less. Another interesting phe­
nomenon is that only the IPOs in the top 10 percent have annualized returns greater than 21.9 percent.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 divide the data to current actively and inactively traded venture firms. It 
is interesting to note that the means for the annualized returns were significantly negative for both current 
actively and for inactively traded firms (-7.64 percent and -80.69 percent, respectively).
Other figures of interest include the standard deviations that are 126.20 percent versus 41.26 percent
for the annualized returns of current actively and inactively traded firms. Also, the top quartile of active ven­
ture-backed public companies shows annualized returns of 12.6 percent or more, whereas the corresponding 
figure for the current inactively traded companies is negative 100 percent. The lower two quartiles for both 
active and inactive categories are negative. Finally, it is worthwhile to note that, for 90 percent of the inac­
tive firms, the annualized returns are negative. For the 90^^ firm the annualized return is equal to negative
8.5 percent. The p values of the t-statistics for all, active and inactive IPOs indicate that the reported means 
are significantly different than zero.
III.2 Empirical Results for Current Actively and Inactively Traded Firms by Stage of Financing
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the annualized returns of both current actively and inactive­
ly traded, venture-backed public companies by stages of financing. The data are divided to the following 
stages of financing: unknown stage, acquisition for expansion, general acquisition, bridge, early-stage, 
expansion, first stage, LBO, open-market purchase, other acquisition, other early stage, other expansion, 
research and development financing, second stage, seed, special situation, startup, third stage, and finally 
financing for turnaround pu^oses.
A few interesting points can be observed from the data in Table 3. The means of annualized retums
for all stages of financing are significantly different from zero and negative, except for second-stage financ­
ing (p=0.142) and acquisition (both general and other acquisition) in which the means are negative but not
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significantly different from zero. The bottom three quartiles show negative returns for bridge, first-stage, 
other expansion, research and development financing, and special situation. Of those stages with positive 
returns for the bottom 75 percent, the following have negative returns at the lower two quartiles: acquisition 
for expansion, early-stage financing, expansion, first stage, LBO, open-market purchase, other early second 
stage, seed, startup, third stage, and turnarounds.
Even if one is wise or lucky enough to pick the venture capital backed firms at the top ten percent of
the distribution, the return is less than 20 percent annually for the 90^^ firm in the distribution, for many
stages of financing. For example, the annualized returns for bridge financing for the 90^^ percentile firm of 
the distribution is 19 percent, 20.9 percent for early stage, and 18.4 percent for first stage. The annualized
returns for bridge financing of the 90^  ^percentile of the distribution is 13.6 percent for open-market pur­
chase, 10.2 percent for other acquisition, 18.3 percent for other early stage financing, and 19.3 percent for 
second stage financing. In the top decile, one also observes that the annualized returns at the acquisition 
stage is impressive, namely 53.3 percent or higher and is equal to 36.9 percent or more for third-stage financ­
ing and above 32.5 percent for acquisition for expansion.
Table 3 reveals that, as one stratifies the data based on stages of financing, there are different rates of 
return. However, it does refute many of the findings mentioned in the literamre surveyed above.
Table 4 duplicates Table 3, but it does so only for current actively traded firms. Table 4 presents the 
annualized returns for current actively traded firms grouped by stages of financing. Note that restricting the 
discussion to current actively traded firms biases the reported returns. Furthermore, many of the firms are 
at the unknown stage of financing in Table 4 because most of these firms are new. Note that the category 
“other expansion” has no active firms.
The mean annualized returns are negative for the following stages: research and development (-3.4 
percent), seed (-1.68 percent), and turnarounds {-1.35 percent). Although the mean values for the above three 
stages of financing are negative, the null hypothesis of annualized returns being equal to zero cannot be 
rejected. Thus, one concludes that all of these mean returns are practically zero. They are at annualized ten 
percent or lower for the following stages of financing: 
first stage (1.34 percent, but not significantly different from zero),
other acquisition (10.2 percent, with too few firms in the sample to conduct formal statistical testing), 
special situation (3.07 percent), 
third-stage (7.45 percent), and 
other early financing (0.63 percent).
For all of these last mentioned stages of financing, the testing of the means of these stages being equal to 
zero cannot be rejected.
The following stages of financing yield annualized returns between 10 and 15 percent: early stage 
(11.48 percent), LBO (11.01 percent), open-market purchase (14.64 percent), and startup (11.62 percent). 
For this group of stages of financing, they are all significantly different from zero. Acquishion financing 
yields annualized returns of 21.34 percent (with p-value of 0.1337) and bridge financing yields -  23.28 per­
cent (with p-value of 0.0636).
The highest mean returns are found in the following three groups: acquisition for expansion (33.13 
percent, but not significantly different from zero), expansion (41.43 percent), and second-stage financing 
(55.62 percent). The last two categories each have a p-value that rejects the null hypothesis that the mean 
returns are equal to zero. However, even for this impressive group, the lower two quartiles of returns are 
only 15.9 percent or less for acquisition for expansion, 4.7 percent or less for expansion, and 2.7 percent or 
less for second-stage financing. At the top 25 percent, the armualized yield is 22.5 percent or more for acqui­
sition for expansion, 25.45 percent or more for expansion, and only 16.2 percent or more for second-stage 
financing.
Table 5 presents the results for the current inactively traded firms. As one might expect, inactive 
firms are performing much worse. For all stages of financing, the means for annualized returns are negative. 
Testing the null hypotheses that the means are equal to zeros is rejected for all stages of production. Even at
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the top 25 percent, all returns are negative. Furthermore, at the top 10 percent, annualized returns are nega­
tive for bridge, early stage, expansion, first stage, LBO, open-market purchase, other acquisition (but only 
one firm in the sample), other early, other expansion, research and development, second stage, startup, and 
third stage. Moreover, for 95 percent of the current actively traded firms, annualized returns are negative for 
bridge, first stage, open-market purchase, other acquisition, other expansion, and research and development.
In addition, at the 90^^ percentile of inactive public companies that were venture capital backed, pos­
itive annualized returns are found only for the following stages of financing: special situation (1.8 percent), 
turnarounds (4.9 percent), seed (8.6 percent), acquisition (25.3), acquisition for expansion (32.5), and 
unknown stage (79.9).
Table 6 presents the independent-sample t-test. The goal is to test whether the means of the two pop­
ulations are equal. For this test, the sample is divided into two mutually exclusive groups; for example, one 
consists of all acquisition financing and the second group consists of all other observations excluding the 
acquisition financing and so on for each of the stages in the database. Then the test is performed using a 
variable common to both groups, which is, in this case, annual returns. The null hypothesis states that the 
population means of the two groups are equal. The two-sided alternate hypothesis states that the means are 
unequal. The two samples or sample groups are independent of each other because no observation is preset 
in both groups.
Since the independent-samples t-test involves two samples, an additional problem arises regarding 
variances. Specifically, the question is whether the two population variances are equal or not. This situation 
is resolved by testing whether the two population variances are equal using data from the samples. This pro­
cedure requires an F-test of homogeneity of variance. If the F-test is not significant, thus leading one to con­
clude that the variances are equal, then the standard independent-samples t-test is employed. Otherwise, one 
decides that the variances are unequal based on a significant F statistic, and then one uses a modified ver­
sion of the independent-samples t-test.
In the current database, this test is demanding because each of the categories has not many firms rel­
ative to the total of 3,063 ventures. The first three columns of data in Table 6 present the F-test results where 
each stage of financing is compared to all other stages of financing for all, current actively and inactively 
traded firms, respectively. Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the null hypotheses of equal variances for all 
firms are rejected by the test for all stages of financing except acquisition for expansion financing (0.1484). 
For current actively traded firms, the null hypotheses of equal variances are rejected for all stages of financ­
ing. However, for current inactively traded firms, the null hypotheses of equal variances can be rejected only 
for unknown stage of financing, acquisition for expansion financing, bridge financing, early stage financing, 
first stage financing, open market purchase financing, and seed financing.
Equipped with the variances results presented in the first three columns of Table 6, columns 4 through
6 in the table present the test of the difference in the means for all, current actively and inactively traded 
firms, respectively. Based on these last three columns one can infer the following. First, by and large, the 
null hypotheses of equal means are rejected for all stages of financing for actively traded firms (column 5) 
except first stage, R«feD, special situation, and turnaround financing. Second, the null hypotheses of equal 
means are rejected for unknown stage financing, expansion financing, and second-stage financing for all 
firms and active firms. Third, the null hypotheses of equal means are rejected for open market purchase for 
all, active and inactive firms. Fourth, the same applies to seed financing in all and in current inactively trad­
ed firms (but not in active firms).
IV. ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND RESULTS
It is postulated that annualized returns are positively correlated with the following factors: current 
actively traded firm versus inactively traded firm, cumulative remrns since the first date of IPO, date of IPO, 
founding year of the company, the current stock price (on August 19, 1998 or the last date of trade for cur­
rent inactively traded firms), and IPO size measured in dollars. Additionally, it is hypothesized that annual­
ized returns are negatively affected by the number of shares issued at the time of IPO and the price of the
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share at the date of the IPO (IPO Price).
It is also postulated that both the date of IPO and year founded positively affect firms’ annualized 
returns because investors are looking for high short-term profits. The number of IPO shares is assumed to 
negatively affect annualized returns. This is because it is more difficult to market a large number of shares. 
The size of the IPO is assumed to positively affect annualized return. In other words, the greater the size, the 
higher the annualized return.
The correlation and regression results for annualized and cumulative returns are presented in Tables
7 and 8. Table 7 presents the Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for these variables; Table 8 presents the 
results of the regression equations. As for the expected signs, the regression equation for annualized returns 
confirms the above hypotheses. However, the coefficients for the founding year of the company and whether 
the firm is current actively or inactively traded are not significant for the annualized returns. The Adjusted 
R-Squared for the annualized return regression equation is 0.26.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper finds that there are different rates of return as one stratifies the data based on stages of 
financing. However, it does refute many of the findings mentioned in the literature surveyed because the 
rates of return are much lower than the literature and the media are quoting.
Furthermore, the paper offers some hypotheses with regards to the determinants of annualized returns 
on venture backed public companies. Annualized returns are found to be positively affected by cumulative 
returns, IPO year, current price, and IPO size in dollars while being negatively influenced by IPO price. 
Further research is currently underway to stratify the data by mdustry classifications.
NOTES
1. The venture capital literature is by now^  vast. Early studies include Mansfield (1969), Weiser 
(1975), Mansfield et al. (1977), Tassey (1977), Cooper and Carleton (1979), Baty (1981), Timmons 
(1981), Mansfield and Romeo (1980), Mansfield (1981, 1983A, 1983B), Martin and Petty (1983), 
Chan (1983), Timmons, Smollen and Dingle (1985), Meggmson (1991), and Schilit (1991). Tax 
policies issues related to venmre capital financing were studied by, among others, Bisesi (1986), 
Bygrave and Shulman (1988), Landau and Jorgenson (1986), Mansfield. (1985, 1986), Mansfield 
and Switzer, (1985), McMurtry (1986), Poterba (1989), and Summers (1989). More recent litera­
ture includes, among others, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Allen and Gale (1994), Berglof (1994), 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), Espenlaub (1999), Gompers (1993, 1995, 1996), Gompers and 
Lemer (1997, 1999), Lemer (1994, 1995), Mason and Harrison (1999), Murray (1999), Reynolds 
and White (1997), Rich and Gumpert (1992), and Smith and Smith (2000).
2. The data is from Securities Data Company Platinum 2.1, Venture Financing 1968-1998, Thomson 
Financial Securities Data, 22 Thomson Place, Boston, MA 02210, and from Venture Economics 
Information Services, Venture Financing 1968 —1998, Newark, NJ 07102. The primary source for the 
data is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including EDGAR, the SEC’s electronic 
database of corporate reports.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
50
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6 (1) 2001
Table 1: Rates of Return (ROR) sought by Venture Capital Investors
Stage Annual ROR 
(Percent)
Typical Expected Holding 
Period (Years)
Seed and start-up 50-100 or more More than 10
First stage 40-60 5-10
Second stage 30-40 4-7
Expansion 20-30 3-5
Bridge and mezzanine 20-30 1-3
LBOs 30-50 3-5
Turnarounds 50+ 3-5
Source: Jeffrey A. Timmons, New Venture Creation. 4*’’ Edition, Chicago Irwine, 1994, 
p. 512. See, also Timmons (1999, page 465).
TABLE 2: Annualized Returns - All, Current Actively and Inactively Traded 
Firms
Statistics All Firms Active Inactive
Mean -45.34 -7.64
-80.69
Median -100 -5.8
-100
Std Dev 99.58 126.20 41.26
Skewness 16.34 15.71 2.33
Kurtosis 483.99 368.64 6.20
Min -100 -100
-100
Max 3296.1 3296.1 219.3
T: Mean=0 -24.50 -2.27
-75.58
Pr> |T | 0.0001 0.0235 0.0001
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Key For Tables 2 - 5
Label on Output Description of Statistic
Mean Ajithmetic mean
Median Median
Std Dev Standard deviation
Skewness Pearson coefficient of skewness
Kurtosis Measure of kurtosis
Min Minimum data value
Max Maximum data value
I : Mean = 0 t-statistic testing the mean equal to zero
Pr> T p value of the t-statistic
TABLE 3: Annualized Returns by Stages o f Financing - All Firms
Unknown Acquisition Acquisition Bridge Early Expansion First LBO Open
Statistics Stage for Stage Stage Market
expansion Purchase
Mean -83.16 -33.92 -18.18 -57.541 -41.19 -29.27 -47.3 -46.429 -54.29
Median
-100 -62.05 2.3 -100 -48.65 -50.9 ^9.5 -77.65 -100
Std Dev 59.97 82.58 61.93 61.62 74.48 193.70 60.27 57.75 57.87
Skewness 8.20 1.87 -0.38 1.23 3.19 13.96 1.70 0.43 0.81
Kurtosis 98.14 6.09 -1.37 0.65 20.54 234.27 6.26 -1.20 -0,29
Min -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Max 718.1 303.9 67.7 135.4 563.5 3296.1 297.7 104.2 147.8
T:Mean=0 -25.19 -2.53 -1.06 -7.17 -8.85 -2.93 -10.08 -9.85 -11,49
Pr>lT| 0.0001 0.016 0.31 0.0001 0.0001 0.0036 0.0001 0.0001 0 0001
Other Other Other R&D Second Seed Special !Startup Third Turnaround
Acquisition Early Expansion Stage Situation! Stage
1
Mean -44.9 -48.85 -100 -72,4 -21,306 -32.96 -52.541 -41,071 -39.16 -41.93
Median -44.9 -58.2 -100 -100 -46,4 -25.55 -looi -43,3 -392 -29,3
Std Dev 77.92 54.91 0 47,16 177.47 59.48 54.881 68.84 58 85 55,02
Skewness 0.58 1.23 7.83 1.83 0.35i 2.39 0.59 0,01
Kurtosis -0.46 -0.81 77.16 10.36 -1.88! 14 38 -0 10 -1 94
Min -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100! -100 -100 -100
Max 10.2 185.7 -100 -0.9 1813.3 373.2 35 3! 550 157 9 369
T:Mean=0 -0 81 -18.08 -4.06 -1.48 -8.58 ^,28i -11 89 -7 14 -2,64
Pr>m 0.56 0.0001 0.007 0.142 0.0001 0 0004! 0.0001 0.0001 0,023
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TABLE 4: Annualized Returns by Stages of Financing - Current Actively 
Traded Firms
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Unknown Acquisition Acquisition Bridge Early Expansion First LBO Open
Statistics Stage for Stage Stage Market
expansion Purchase
Mean -84.39 33.13 21.34 23.28 11.48 41.44 1.34 11.01 14.65
Median -100 15.9 13.3 1 3.4 4.7 0 15 8.4 7.3
Std Dev 59.21 82.20 32.57 46 49 75.7602 277.81 54.51 27.88 30.70
Skewness 8.70 3.47 0.07 1.22 4.80 10.44 3.08 1.15 2.64
Kurtosis 107.15 12.33 -0.69 0.88 30.06 120.43 13,92 2.97 8.82
Min -100 -9.6 -27 -37.5 -68.3 -100 -75.6 -49 -33.2
Max 718.1 303.9 67.7 135 4 563.5 3296,1 297,7 104.2 147.8
T;Mean=0 -25.50 1.45 1.73 2.00 1.62499 1.887 0.203 2.929 3.407
Pr>m 0.0001 0.1718 0.1337 0.0636 0.1069 0.061 0,8398 0.005 0.0013
Other Other R&D Second Seed Special Startup Third Turnaround
Statistics Acquisition Early Stage Situation Stage
Mean 10.2 0,64 -3 4 55.62 -1.68 3.07 11.62 7.45 -1.35
Median 10,2 0.4 -3.4 2.7 -6.8 -3.6 ■2.95 1 -3.8
Std Dev 33.02 3.54 241.24 51.16 16.81 61.52 42.13 29.54
Skewness 1,373366 6.22 4.26 1.42 5.02 1.40 -0.51
Kurtosis 6,600783 43.93 28.01 1.57 36.98 3.11 0.82
Min 10.2 -100 -5.9 -64.6 -82.4 -12.9 -62.8 -58.6 -49.3
Max 102 185.7 -0.9 1813.3 373.2 35.3 550 157.9 36.9
T:Mean=0 0.250 -1.36 1.89 -0.37 0.48 2.45 1.24 -0.11
Pr>|T| 0.80 0.40 0.06 0.71 0.65 002 0.22 0.92
TABLE 5: Annualized Returns by Stages of Financing - Current Inactively 
Traded Firms
Statistics Unknown Acquisition Acquisition {Bridge Early Expansion First LBO Open
Stage for 1 Stage Stage Market
expansion Purchase
Mean ^3.75 -68.79 -64.28 -87.61 -84.15 -81.89 -81.39 -79.68 -89.80
Median -77.9 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Std Dev 73.68 58.59 56.51 32.52 35.94 41.32 35.80 42.33 29.39
Skewness 1.15 1.51 1 14 2.46 2.18 2,79 1.73 1.94 2.65
Kurtosis 0.18 0.57 -0.83 4.64 3.66 10,30 1.69 2.66 5.41
Min -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Max 102.2 65,8 25.3 19 65.7 195 47.9 74.1 22.8
T Mean=0 -1.88 -5,87 -2.79 -17.67 -27.80
-29,06 -22.39 -18.35 -30.40
Pr>|T| 0,093 0,0001 0.039 0.0001 0.0001 0 0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Statistics Other other Other |R&D Second Seed Special Startup 1 Third Turnaround
Acquistion Early Expansion Stage Situation Stage
1
Mean -100 -82.45 -100 -100 -82,67 -69,31 -82.48
-79.73 -73.77
-82,52
Median -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
-100 -100
-100
Std Dev 39.11 0 0 45,37 46,49 43.04 43.74! 43.70 4283
Skewness 2.14 3,32 1,39 2.24 2 82j 140 245
Kurtosis 3.53 13,35 1,25 3.69 11,01| 0,63 6,00
Min -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
-100! -100
-100
Max -100 88.3 -100 -100 178,1 98.2 25.9 219,3j 54,5 4,9
T:Mean=0 -33.07 -16,70 -15,71 -6.91
-27,591 -13.72
-4,72
Pr>|T| 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0.0001 0,00011 0,0001 0,005
1______
53
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
TABLE 6: Independent-Samples t-Tests for Differences in Means
Prob>F Prob>F Prob>F Prob>|T| Prob>|T| Prob>|T|
Stage All Active Inactive All Active Inactive
Unknown 0.00001 0.00001 0.0013 0,0001 0.0001 0.1452
Acq. for Expansion 0.1484 0.0893 0.004 0,4769 0.0984 0.314
Acquisition 0.0618 0.0023 0.1893 0,1397 0.0569 0.3293
Bridge 0.00001 0.00001 0.0488 0.1355 0.019 0.167
Early Stage 0.00001 0.00001 0,0235 0.3687 0.0094 0.239
Expansion 0.00001 0.00001 0.9591 0.0687 0.0132 0.6459
First Stage 0.00001 0.00001 0.0587 0.6832 0.2102 0.8432
LBO 0.00001 0.00001 0.6868 0,8219 0.0002 0.8061
Open Market Purchase 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.066 0.0001 0.0025
Other Early 0.00001 0.00001 0.2117 0.2327 0.0407 0.4651
R&D 0.0616 0.0447 NA 0.18 0.3415 0.2947
Second Stage 0.00001 0.00001 0.1779 0.0834 0.0283 0.6513
Seed 0.00001 0.00001 0.0443 0.0019 0.26 0.0078
Special Situation 0.0031 0.00001 0.7321 0.5657 0.1659 0.8748
Startup 0.00001 0.00001 0.1604 0.22 0.0003 0.7016
Third Stage 0.00001 0.00001 0.4591 0,2704 •0.0271 0.1638
Turnaround 0.0296 0.0038 0.7427 0.8345 0.6325 0.9134
NA - Not Applicable
TABLE 7: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix
Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > |R; under Ho: Rho=0 / Number o f Observations
{Annualized 1 Cumulative IPO Founding Current IPO IPO IPO
ACTIV^ Return i Return Year Year Price Price Shares (MIL) Size ($)
' 1
ACTIVE 1i 0.366641 0.13054 0.3939 0.07553 0.12916 0.0814 0.11662 0.14969
o: 0.00011 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0,0001 0.0001 0,0001
Annualized 0.3666! 1^  0.30291 0 1637 0.01579 0.44997 0.0312 0,01242 0.0169
Return 0.0001! 0; 0.0001 0.0001 0.4145 0.0001 0,093 0.504 0,3634
I
Cumulative 0 1305: 0.30291 1 -0.0144 -0.01867 0,3116 -0.0273 0.20461 -0.0135
Return 0 0001: 0.0001 0 0 4376 0.3346 0,0001 0,1414 0.0001 0.467
IPO 0.3939. 0.1637 -0.01443 1 0.10048 -0,11307 -0,0208 0,24013 0.2507
Year 0,00011 0.00011 0.4376 0 0.0001 0.0001 0,2636 0,0001 0.0001
--------- 1-------  ' ■ ■ !
Founding 0,07551 0.01579' -0.01867 0,1005 1 0.0573 0.2146 0,04375 0.07501
Year 0.0001 i 0.4145 0.3346 0.0001 0 0.0339 0.0001 0,0235 0.0001
i
Current 0.1292. 0.44997: 0.3116 -0.1131 0.0573 1 0.2621 0,03146 0.14487
Price 0.0001; 0.0001: 0.0001 0.0001 0.0339 0 0.0001 0,2312 0.0001
IPO 0.0814 0,03122 -0.02734 -0.0208 0.2146 0.26214 1 0.02655 0.24318
Price 0.0001 0.093 0.1414 0.2636 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.1529 0.0001
!
IPO 0.1166: 0.01242 0.20461 0.2401 0.04375 0,03146 0.0266 1 0.74436
Share (Mil.) 0.0001. 0,504  ^ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0235 0,2312 0 1529 0 0.0001
, ;
IPO 0,1497i 0.0169' -0.01352 0.2507 0.07501 0,14487 0.2432 0.74436 1
Size ($) 0.0001 0.3634 0.467 0.0001 0.0001 0,0001 0.0001 0.0001 0
In each cell, the first raw gives the Pearson Correlation Coefficients.
The second raw presents Probability that |R| under Ho: Rho=0 |
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TABLE 8: Regression Results for Annualized Returns
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Dependent Variable; Annualized Return
Parameter Standard T for HO;
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > |T|
Intercept -7465.670592 1136.447169 -6.569 0,0001
Active 8.89164 6.97017023 1.276 0.2023
Cumulative Return 0.040212 0.00532813 7,547 0.0001
IPO year 3.455758 0.53954697 6.405 0.0001
Founding Year 0.288093 0.2122814 1.357 0.175
Current Price 2.848425 0.24855455 11.46 0.0001
IPO Price -1.475938 0.40660568 -3.63 0.0003
IPO shares (Million) -0 000018338 0.00000317 -5,784 0.0001
IPO Size ($) 0.000000991 0.00000021 4.696 0.0001
R-square 0.2669
Adj. R-sq. 0.2624
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